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Abstract
It is believed that the behavior of states towards one another is infl uenced by the 
extent of economic linkages between them. One line of thinking could be that 
states that have a higher degree of economic connection would exhibit more 
positive behavior towards each other and vice versa. The positive relationship 
between the degree of economic dependence and political relations is challenged 
by the arguments of asymmetrical dyads theory, which contends that the higher 
the degree of concentration on a particular partner, the more the foreign policy 
behavior towards that partner. Given that higher economic concentration on a 
superordinate country may generate a feeling of vulnerability among the political 
elites in the dependent state, thereby propelling a desire for diversifi cation and 
autonomy, such a proposition should not be utterly discountenanced. The debate 
on the nature of the relationship between various economic factors (trade, 
foreign direct investment, development assistance, etc.) and political relations 
between states remains a potent intellectual enterprise.
This research is driven by the desire to explore the connection between 
the degree of trade concentration of a partner and the foreign policy behavior in 
the asymmetrical context. There are two dyadic sets involving Japan and Korea 
as the superordinate countries, while nine East Asian countries are selected as 
subordinate samples. The period of study is from 1995 to 2005. Using ordinary 
least squares (OLS) estimation of a linear regression model with cross-sectional 
data, the study fi nds that trade concentration is signifi cant and positively related 
to foreign policy behavior in Korea’s dyadic set, however, there is no evidence 
that trade concentration has a signifi cant effect on foreign policy behavior in 
Japan’s set.
Keywords: asymmetrical dependence, East Asia, foreign policy behavior, Japan, Korea, 
trade concentration.
Introduction
That trade has certain effects on the external behavior of states is not in question; what is 
of interest is how great those effects are and what form they take. The nature of the nexus 
between a nation’s external trade and its foreign policy orientation has attracted scholarly 
attention for decades. The conventional belief is that foreign policy behavior towards 
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an economically stronger partner is more positive when trade ties with that partner are 
relatively stronger. Conversely, foreign policy behavior tends to be less positive when 
trade ties are negligible. While the impact of trade dependence on foreign policy behavior 
has been the focus of a good number of studies, the nature of the nexus between trade and 
foreign policy remains generally contested.
Following the existing tradition of scholarship, the current research begins with 
the assumption that one of the primary concerns of policy makers is a desire to improve 
the welfare of their citizenry, which requires the attraction of foreign capital via aid, 
investment, and favorable trade terms that catalyzes economic growth and development. 
At the same time, there is a countervailing objective of political autonomy, which states 
covet and are usually unwilling to part with. Often, there is an inverse relationship 
between the objective of economic well-being and political autonomy, whereby a desire to 
improve the economy necessitates a closer relationship (in the form of policy coordination, 
alignment, etc.) with an economically and technologically advanced partner. Such a closer 
relationship often requires some deference to the preferences of the superordinate target 
in order to attract the expected gains. This delicate balancing of the goal of economic 
well-being with that of political autonomy is particularly acute in economically weak 
and dependent political systems, and distinguishes them from economically strong and 
developed ones (Dolan et al. 1982).
Interstate relations take place in asymmetrical contexts, where the foreign policy 
behavior of a country on the lower side of the asymmetry is shaped by factors such 
as the relative strength of its economy and the degree of dependence on a particular 
partner (hereinafter termed linkage concentration). The degree of linkage concentration 
could be determined by the proportion of foreign direct investment, foreign aid, or trade 
that a dependent state has with a particular partner. In this study, the effects of trade 
dependence (import concentration and export concentration as separate variables) on 
foreign policy behavior is examined using Japan and South Korea as the superordinate 
samples, while nine Southeast Asian countries are used as subordinate samples.1 The 
underlying assumption is that the higher the degree of trade concentration on a particular 
partner, the more positive the foreign policy behavior towards that partner. Conversely, a 
lower trade concentration on a partner is expected to produce less positive foreign policy 
behavior towards the target partner. In other words, it is assumed that there is a positive 
relationship between trade concentration and positive foreign policy behavior. This is the 
central thesis underlying the current study.
1   The terms “superordinate” and “subordinate” are used here for analytical purposes only and are not 
meant to carry any paternalistic or derogatory connotations. Indeed, in asymmetry literature, such 
terminologies as “topdog” and “underdog,” “dominant” and “dependent,” and “large-country” and 
“small-country” are commonplace. These concepts are meant to draw a line, however contentious, 
between the upper and lower ends of the asymmetry pendulum.
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Figure 1 
Source: Author’s computation with data from the MOFA website (http://www.mofa.go.jp/
region/index.html)
Figure 1 shows the foreign policy behavior of sampled East Asian countries towards Japan 
between 1995 and 2005. The procedure for the estimation of foreign policy behavior 
is explained in the methodology section. The fi gure shows that Indonesia has the most 
positive foreign policy behavior towards Japan, while Laos PDR has the most negative 
foreign policy behavior. A similar graph for Korea is presented below.
Figure 2 
Source: author’s computation with data from the MOFAT website (http://www.mofat.
go.kr/english)
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Figure 2 shows the foreign policy behavior of sampled East Asian countries towards the 
Republic of Korea (ROK) between 1995 and 2005. It reveals a different pattern from 
Fig 1. Unlike the case of Japan, Mongolia has the most positive foreign policy behavior 
towards ROK, while Thailand has the most negative foreign policy behavior.
Figure 3
Source: Author’s computation with data from Japan Customs, World Development 
Indicators (WDI) and UN Comtrade.
Fig. 3 shows the trade concentration with Japan by the sampled East Asian countries 
between 1995 and 2005. It reveals that Thailand has the highest trade concentration with 
Japan, while Laos PDR has the lowest trade concentration with Japan. When the trade 
concentration is juxtaposed with the foreign policy behavior, some patterns become 
discernible. While Thailand has the highest trade concentration with Japan, it does not 
have the most positive foreign policy behavior towards Japan. This tends to suggest that, 
based on preliminary analysis, that the nexus between trade concentration and foreign 
policy behavior is tenuous or non-existent. On the other hand, Laos PDR has the lowest 
trade concentration with Japan, and also exhibits the most negative foreign policy behavior 
towards Japan. This suggests that the effects of trade concentration on foreign policy 
behavior is, perhaps, more palpable at the lower echelons. The purpose of this research is 
to empirically test the nature of the relationship between trade concentration and foreign 
policy behavior, which graphical representation has not clarifi ed suffi ciently.
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Figure 4
Source: author’s computation with data from WDI and UN Comtrade.
A similar pattern is noticeable in the Korean case. There is an apparent incongruence 
between the countries that have the highest trade concentration with Korea and those 
with the most positive foreign policy behavior towards Korea. Although Vietnam posts 
the highest trade concentration with ROK, it does not display the most positive foreign 
policy behavior towards Korea. By the same token, while Laos PDR has the lowest trade 
concentration with ROK, it does not show the most negative foreign policy behavior 
towards Korea. This raises questions on the nature of the relationship between trade 
concentration and foreign policy behavior. Exploring this relationship is the primary 
objective of the current research.
While exploring the empirical validity of the projected relationship between trade 
concentration and foreign policy behavior is novel in itself, it does not reveal the relative 
impact and the nature of the separate effects of import and export activity on foreign 
policy behavior. Some studies argue that, from the perspective of a subordinate country, 
exporting is most likely to have a greater effect on foreign policy behavior, especially 
when the supply of the export commodities is elastic (Richardson and Kegley 1980). This 
is because if there are alternative suppliers of the same commodity, or if the commodity 
has a close substitute, a dependent country is more likely to deploy all its diplomatic 
resources towards retaining and consolidating the relationship with its existing trade 
partner. With regard to the effects of import on foreign policy behavior, except when the 
imported item is crucial to the survival of the state, its supply is inelastic, or there is no 
close substitute, its effect on foreign policy behavior may be less palpable. In addition to 
investigating the relationship between trade concentration with a particular partner and 
foreign policy behavior, this study disaggregates trade into import and export components 
in order to examine further the relative effect of each on foreign policy behavior.
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Theoretical Background and Existing Scholarship
Among early scholarly attempts that synthesize economic factors with political forces in 
order to explain the structure and patterns of infl uence in international relations is Albert 
Hirschman’s National Power and the Structure of Foreign Trade (Hirschman 1945). 
By looking at Germany’s drive to expand its trade and political infl uence in Eastern 
and South-Eastern Europe in the inter-war years, Hirschman exposed the “structural 
characteristics” of international economic relations that, in his words, “make the pursuit 
of power a relatively easy task” (Hirschman 1978; 1998). To him, “power elements and 
disequilibria are potentially inherent in such ‘harmless’ trade relations … between big and 
small, rich and poor, industrial and agricultural …” (Hirschman 1998). The persuasive 
edge in Hirschman’s thesis is as sharp today as it was then. To date, the political fallouts 
of foreign trade, development assistance and other economic activities are perennially 
palpable, in so far as “gains” or expected benefi ts from such transactions are unequal, 
depending on which country receives them and which bestows them.
Surprisingly, despite the fact that international economic factors have long been 
assumed to affect foreign policy behavior, only a few scholars have ventured into the 
minefi eld of quantitative and cross-national investigation of this political-economic 
proposition. Among such scholars is Wittkopf, with his study of the voting behavior 
of foreign aid recipients in the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) (Wittkopf 
1973). The purpose was to compare the voting (roll-call) agreement between donors 
(and their foreign aid recipients) with the voting patterns of non-recipient countries. In 
a study that involved 14 aid donors, it was found that the level of voting agreement 
was higher among the recipients of U.S. aid than among recipients of aid from other 
donors. A similar approach was applied by Neil Richardson to examine the infl uence of 
foreign trade on foreign policy behavior (Richardson 1976). Using the UNGA voting 
agreement between the United States and a group of states that were trade-dependent on 
it, Richardson discovered a positive relationship between trade dependence and positive 
foreign policy behavior (proxied by UNGA roll-call votes) (Richardson 1976). In other 
words, the higher the degree of trade dependence on the United States, the greater the 
voting agreement with the United States, and vice versa.
The fi ndings from the two studies described above provide empirical support for 
the proposition that economic forces infl uence the behavior of states towards each other, 
depending on which state is the benefi ciary and which is the benefactor. Another study 
that adopts a similar theoretical thrust was conducted by Rothgeb, whose study differed 
from Wittkopf’s and Richardson’s by using investment penetration rather than aid or trade 
as a measure of dependence (Rothgeb 1987). In an elaborate study, Roeder combines aid 
and trade to examine the extent of political compliance by the Soviet Union-dependent 
countries (Roeder 1985). He fi nds that trade dependence on the Soviet Union provides a 
signifi cant source of political compliance with the Soviet Union. Interestingly, Roeder’s 
study sheds light on an important proposition; that trade, rather than economic aid, is an 
important source of direct infl uence.
The pioneering efforts of the scholars described above have brought us closer to 
understanding the nexus between economic factors and foreign policy behavior of states. 
However, most of the fi ndings have generally been tentative, inconclusive, and sometimes 
contentious. This renders further inquiry into the subject a potent intellectual enterprise. 
Ironically, such studies have been few and far between, and almost entirely lacking in 
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Asian setting, where applying this theoretical proposition is not only useful, but novel. 
This study is a contribution towards fi lling this vacuum. Following the existing tradition 
of scholarship, the central assumption of the current research is that trade concentration 
has a positive effect on foreign policy behavior. Put differently, high trade concentration 
on a partner should produce more positive foreign policy behavior towards that partner, 
and vice versa. This proposition and other related ones will be explored and tested in the 
course of the study.
Variables, Samples and Methodology
Variables
The dependent variable is foreign policy behavior, while the independent variables include 
economic strength, linkage concentration, and ratio of imports with the superordinate 
partner to total imports, as well as ratio of exports to the superordinate partner to total 
exports. In order to measure foreign policy behavior, event data approach is used in this 
research. This entails, by some rules of inclusion and exclusion, the collation of data 
from events that involved each of the dyads within the period of study. This is based 
on the belief that the behavior of states towards one another is captured by the number 
of “events” that take place between them. In other words, countries with (or that are 
willing to develop) stronger relations are likely to record more events, and vice versa. The 
use of event data in international relations research could be said to have evolved from 
McClelland’s pioneering efforts in the 1960s, from which a number of other event data 
sets sprang.2 Although event data collection nose-dived in the mid-1980s, the approach 
has experienced a revival because it remains valuable to “systematically code a very large 
number of individual foreign policy interactions and then use that information to test 
general hypotheses about foreign policy behavior using statistical techniques” (Schrodt 
1995).
One of the foremost proponents of event data in quantitative international relations 
research is Rummel, who identifi es two ways of coding foreign policy events. These include 
frequency of events and scaling/weighting of events. According to him, “frequencies 
stay close to events, minimize assumptions, and allow the data themselves to show the 
patterns” (Rummel  1972). However, the problem is that the frequency technique assigns 
equal weights to different event types, irrespective of the nature and real consequences 
of those events. Scaling/weighting of events corrects for the weaknesses of the frequency 
coding technique. In the current research, both approaches are combined to avoid the 
weaknesses inherent in each. In other words, the total frequency of the events as well their 
respective weights are accounted for in the estimation of foreign policy behavior.
The next step is to determine which “event” to include (or exclude) as proxy 
for the dependent variable, as well as how to assign weights to them. To do this, it is 
necessary to revisit the conception of the term “event”. It is noteworthy that, despite the 
increasing popularity of the usage of event date in foreign policy analysis, there is no 
consensus on what constitutes an event. The Confl ict and Peace Data Bank (COPDAB) 
project defi nes events as:
2   These include, among others, The Conflict and Peace Data Bank (COPDAB), World Event Interaction Survey 
(WEIS), Dimensionality of Nations (DON), and the Comparative Research on the Event of Nations (CREON). For 
details on these event data projects, see Azar 1980: 143-152; McClelland 1976; Rummel 1972; Hermann et al. 1973 
respectively.
－22－
… occurrences between nations which are distinct enough from the constant 
fl ow of “transactions” (trade, mail fl ow, travel, and so on) to stand out against 
this background as “reportable” or “newsworthy.” Thus, to qualify as an “event,” 
an occurrence has to be actually reported in some reputable and available public 
source. (Schrodt et al. 1994).
The above defi nition serves as a useful conceptual framework in delineating what 
constitutes an “event.” From the defi nition, it is clear that the “events” must have been 
reported in publicly available and reputable source(s) to qualify for inclusion. It also 
implies that an event involves some activity by an actor towards another within a specifi ed 
period of time.
For analytical convenience, I follow McGowan’s construction of scale values and 
indicators of foreign policy behavior, which includes stated offi cial desires or actions 
that indicate an actor’s intention to increase, reduce, withdraw, or terminate relations 
with the target partner (McGowan 1972). The word offi cial is very instructive here. Only 
offi cially recognized, sponsored, or sanctioned events or activities merit inclusion. Unlike 
other event data sets that rely on journalistic sources, this research obtains information 
on events from offi cial sources. Basically, offi cial events, such-as top-level visits, summit 
meetings, agreements/treaties, as well as cultural exchanges that are reported and publicly 
available, qualify for inclusion.
However, since events usually do not carry equal weights, there is a need for 
further clarifi cation. McGowan’s scale, which the current research uses, ranges from (-2) 
to (+2). “Withdrawal” (-2) signifi es an actor’s desire or action that suggests an intention 
to withdraw from or terminate all relations with the superordinate partner. “Reduction” 
(-1) indicates an actor’s desire or action that signifi es an intention to reduce political, 
economic, and other forms of relations with the partner. “Neutral” (0) occurs when an 
actor displays no particular concern with either increasing or reducing relations. It also 
includes unclear or ambiguous situations. “Increase” (+1) describes an actor’s desire or 
willingness to increase diplomatic, economic, cultural, and other forms of interaction 
with the superordinate target. This includes attendance at conferences, summit meetings, 
and top-level visits (McGowan 1972).3 Absorb/Integrate (+2) indicates a stated action or 
desire that demonstrates an actor’s desire to strengthen its relations with the superordinate 
country in such a way as to absorb or integrate with the target (McGowan 1973-1976).4
3   Here, I have made a slight modifi cation to McGowan’s scale. Because exchange visits and summit di-
plomacy vary according to the status of the offi cials involved, assigning equal values (+1) would not 
adequately capture the essence of the indicator, and may be misleading. Therefore, visits by presidents, 
prime ministers, and their deputies are taken as a high indication of desire to increase relations, and a 
value of (+2) was assigned. The same applies to visits by Imperial Majesties and other constitutional 
monarchs. Visits that involve the King, Queen or Crown Prince are assigned (+2), while visits by other 
royals are coded (+1). Other government offi cials, like ministers of foreign affairs and equivalent, as 
well as lower-ranked offi cials, were coded (+1).
4   Because these are dyadic relations, integration (usually multilateral in nature and scope) has little con-
ceptual relevance. Nonetheless, in cases where there is an Economic Partnership Agreement (EPA) that 
has been ratifi ed by the parliaments of the states concerned, a rating of (+2) was assigned. This is be-
cause an EPA is considered a strong indication of intention to amplify relations with the target. For other 
agreements, such as an Investment Protection and Promotion Agreement (IPPA), etc., a value of (+1) 
was assigned.
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Having discussed the coding procedure, foreign policy behavior between each set 
of dyads is estimated using the formula below:
ܨܲܤ = σ(݂ݎ݁ݍݑ݁݊ܿݕ ݋݂ ݁ݒ݁݊ݐݏ ݋݊ ݄݁ܽܿ ݏ݈ܿܽ݁ ݒ݈ܽݑ݁ ݔ ݏ݈ܿܽ݁ ݒ݈ܽݑ݁)ݐ݋ݐ݈ܽ ݊ݑܾ݉݁ݎ ݋݂ ݕ݁ܽݎݏ.  
Although McGowan’s scale offers an interesting numerical procedure for estimating a 
state’s foreign policy behavior, there are certain drawbacks to its application in the current 
study that deserve to be highlighted. First, there is no single comprehensive data bank5 
on foreign policy events and activities of the subordinate samples from which the study 
can draw data. If there were such a data pool, it might have been possible to estimate the 
foreign policy behavior, in addition to the simple dyadic calculation, as a proportion of 
each state’s total external events within some timeframe. Such comprehensive data would 
have equally allowed for annual variations in the frequency and weight of the proxies that 
would lend the study to fi xed effect empirical analyses.6 Second, following from above, 
it is diffi cult to establish the exhaustiveness and comprehensiveness of the foreign policy 
data available to this study. As a result of the lack of a single comprehensive data bank, 
the research relied on offi cial data sources.7 The formula for the estimation of foreign 
policy behavior is given as:
FPB=frequency of events on each scale value x scale value/11
With respect to the independent variables, they are operationalized as follows:
Economic Strength (E)
E={(GDP)+(GDP per capita)+(energy use)+(energy use per capita)/4
ΔE={(%Δ in GDP)+(%Δ in GDP per capita)+(%Δ in energy use)+(%Δ in energy use per 
capita) /4
Trade Concentration
C={(exports to major sample÷total exports)+(imports from major sample÷total 
imports)/2
ΔC={(%Δ exports to major sample÷ %Δ total exports)+(%Δ imports from major 
sample÷%Δ total imports)/2
5   Such as the Africa Project data that provided the base for Dolan et al. 1980: 415-449, or DON project 
that offered the springboard for Rummel 1979, the WEIS data that served as the wellspring for studies 
such as Wilkenfeld et al. 1980, or the COPDAB in Azar 1980: 143-152, also used in Rothgeb, Jr. 1987: 
227-265.
6   The Fixed Effect model allows for tests on the impact of the exogenous variable on the variations in the 
endogenous variable.
7   For dyads involving Japan, data was collected from the website of the Gaimusho (Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs, MOFA), the Diplomatic Bluebook and the websites of the ministries of foreign affairs of sub-
ordinate samples in the dyads, as well as the respective diplomatic missions. With respect to the Korean 
dyadic set, data was retrieved from the website of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade of Korea 
(MOFAT) and the websites of the ministries of foreign affairs of the respective subordinate samples 
in the set, as well as the websites of the diplomatic missions. This collation approach concurs with 
the COPDAB’s conception that for an “event” to qualify for inclusion, it must be reported in a public 
source.
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Table 1: Variable Description and Data Sources
Foreign Policy Behavior Japan’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/index.html
Korea’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade 
http://www.mofat.go.kr/english
Economic Strength (E)
Change in Economic Strength (ΔE)
World Development Indicators (WDI)
US Energy Information Agency
Trade Concentration
Change in Trade Concentration (ΔC)
World Development Indicators (WDI)
World Trade Atlas (Japan Customs Data)
UNCTAD Handbook of Trade Statistics
 UN COMTRADE
Table 2: Main Samples and Subordinate Samples
Main Samples
Japan Korea
Subordinate Samples
Brunei Darussalam, Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos PDR, Malaysia, Mongolia, Philippines, Thailand, 
Vietnam
For each of the major samples, there are nine dyads over 11 observational years (1995-2005).
Empirical Models
Foreign   Policy   Behavior   =   f(Economic   Strength,   Trade   Concentration, 
...u)………………..(1)
In order to account for other omitted environmental and control variables, the simplifi ed 
specifi cation of this model takes the functional form:
ܨܲܤ݅ = ߚ0 + ߚ1 ݈݋݃ܧ݅ + ߚ2 ܥ݅ +  ݑ … … … … … … … … … . (2) 
ܨܲܤ݅ = ߚ0 + ߚ1 ݈݋݃ܧ݅ + ߚ2 ܥ݅ + ߚ3 ݎ݅݉݌݅ + ߚ4  ܼ݅ + ݑ … … … . . (3) 
Where FPB is foreign policy behavior, E is relative economic strength, C is trade 
concentration, rimp is the ratio of import concentration, i indexes the country under study, 
z represents the set of additional explanatory variables, and u is the error term.
Ordinary least squares (OLS) estimation of a linear regression model using 
cross-sectional data is used. This is because “the OLS model permits inferences with 
respect to the direction and strength of causality between a dependent variable and a 
set of independent variables” (Johnson et al. 1987). Variables E and C are lagged for a 
year in order to account for delayed impact of the explanatory variables, and to avoid 
endogeneity of any of the explanatory variables with the dependent variable. A test for 
homoskedasticity was conducted. This is in conformity with Gujarati’s warning that “[i]n 
short, if we persist in using the usual testing procedures (OLS) despite heteroskedasticity, 
whatever conclusions we draw or inferences we make may be very misleading” (Gujarati 
2003:399). Breusch-Pagan (P-value = .9208) and White’s test (0.342) confi rm that the 
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variance of the error term is constant, meaning that it is not heteroskedastic.
Empirical Results and Main Findings
Based on the proposition set out earlier, a positive relationship between trade concentration 
and foreign policy behavior is expected. The results from the analysis of the effects of 
the independent variables (economic strength, trade concentration, import concentration, 
and export concentration) on foreign policy behavior with respect to Japan and Korea’s 
dyadic sets are presented in Table 3. In Japan’s dyadic set, there is no evidence that 
economic strength and trade concentration have a signifi cant effect on foreign policy 
behavior. On the other hand, the results from the analysis of Korea’s dyadic set reveal 
that economic strength has a positive effect on foreign policy behavior. In other words, 
foreign policy behavior between Korea and countries with stronger economies is more 
positive compared with that between Korea and countries that have weaker economies. 
The positive coeffi cient rejects the proposition of asymmetrical dyads theorists, which 
contends that there is an inverse relationship between relative economic strength of 
subordinate countries and foreign policy behavior towards a superordinate target. 
Contrary to that assumption, foreign policy behavior appears to be more positive with 
countries that have stronger economies. This fi nding should not be too surprising, given 
the transformations in the global political economy, which is now markedly different from 
the Cold War years, when most asymmetrical theories on foreign policy behavior were 
churned out. In today’s world, the stronger the economy of a country becomes, the more 
integration into the network of global trade and investment the country experiences, and 
the more expansionary its foreign policy behavior towards superordinate target countries 
becomes. This may explain why the coeffi cient did not move in the direction predicted by 
theories on asymmetrical foreign policy behavior.
With respect to the effect of trade concentration on foreign policy behavior, the 
results from the analysis did not support the hypothesized relationship in both sets. In 
Japan’s dyadic set, there is no evidence of a signifi cant relationship between the two 
variables. However, results from the analysis of Korea’s set yields some interesting 
fi ndings. Trade concentration is statistically signifi cant at the 5% level, implying that the 
degree of trade concentration on Korea infl uences foreign policy behavior towards Korea. 
Contrary to the expected relationship, the result reveals a negative relationship between 
the degree of trade concentration on Korea and the foreign policy behavior towards ROK. 
This suggests that high trade concentration yields negative foreign policy behavior. Put 
differently, countries that have a high trade concentration with Korea exhibit more negative 
foreign policy behavior towards Korea. While this fi nding contradicts the proposition of 
the current research, there is theoretical support for the fi nding. Theories of asymmetrical 
foreign policy behavior assume a negative relationship between the degree of linkage 
concentration and foreign policy behavior. 
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Table 3: Results of OLS Regression Estimates for Japan and Korea’s Dyadic Sets
Variables Japan Korea
Economic Strength 0.0027
(0.044)
1.911**
(0.371)
Trade Concentration 1.906
(2.87)
241.08**
(57.3)
Change in Economic Strength 0.009
(0.02)
0.33**
(0.065)
Change in Trade Concentration 121*
(.052)
20.7**
(3.53)
Import Concentration 1.04
(0.67)
223.6**
(54.07)
Export Concentration 0.023
(0.271)
67.94*
(17.78)
Constant 1.14 14.27
R-Square 0.65 0.88
No. of Observations 9 9
Time Period 11 11
Notes: The fi gures in parentheses below the estimates are standard errors; *, **, and *** 
are statistically signifi cant at 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively.
This is because, according to exponents of the theory, high linkage concentration elicits 
some elements of vulnerability, which propels a movement of contractionary behavior 
towards a superordinate target (Dolan et al. 1980).
The results from the analysis of the effect of change in economic activity on 
foreign policy behavior shows different outcomes in Japan and Korea’s dyadic sets. 
In Japan’s set, change in economic strength of the subordinate states does not have a 
statistically signifi cant effect on foreign policy behavior. On the other hand, the variable 
has a statistically signifi cant effect on foreign policy behavior in Korea’s set. This implies 
that as countries experience relative growth in their economic strength, foreign policy 
behavior towards the ROK becomes less positive, which confi rms the prediction of the 
asymmetrical dyads theory.
The analysis of the relationship between change in trade concentration and foreign 
policy behavior for the two dyadic sets also shows different fi ndings. In Japan’s set, the 
analysis reveals that change in trade concentration has a statistically signifi cant and 
negative effect on foreign policy behavior. This suggests that incremental change in trade 
concentration with Japan does not produce increasingly positive foreign policy behavior. 
On the other hand, the variable is statistically signifi cant and positively related to foreign 
policy behavior in Korea’s set, suggesting that incremental change in trade concentration 
yields more positive foreign policy behavior.
In order to explore the specifi c effects of import and export on foreign policy 
behavior as part of the objectives of the current research highlighted in the preceding 
sections, trade concentration was decomposed into import concentration and export 
concentration. When the analysis was conducted, the results showed a similar pattern 
to previous results in Japan’s dyadic set. Neither import concentration nor export 
concentration has a signifi cant effect on foreign policy behavior. Meanwhile, a similar 
analysis of Korea’s set shows that import concentration and export concentration are 
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statistically signifi cant at the 5% and 10% levels, respectively. The positive coeffi cients 
of the two variables suggest that the higher the import concentration and the higher the 
export concentration, the more positive the foreign policy behavior in Korea’s dyadic 
set. It could also mean that countries that have high levels of import or export links with 
Korea have more positive foreign policy behavior towards Seoul.
Conclusion and Further Research 
From the foregoing analyses, there are two main discernible patterns in the relationship 
between trade the degree of trade concentration on a superordinate partner (alongside other 
variables) and foreign policy behavior. Japan’s dyadic set, in which trade concentration has 
a limited infl uence on foreign policy behavior, exemplifi es one pattern. It is possible that, 
perhaps, Foreign Direct Investment (FDI), Offi cial Development Assistance (ODA) or 
some combination of these economic variables may yield a palpable infl uence on foreign 
policy behavior. Future research may explore the relationship between economic factors 
and foreign policy with respect to Japan’s relationship with selected states. Meanwhile, 
the analysis of Korea’s dyadic set offers some useful insights into the relationship between 
trade concentration and other economic factors on foreign policy behavior.
This study fi nds that the relative economic strength of the sample East Asian 
countries is a signifi cant factor that determines their foreign policy behavior towards the 
ROK. Contrary to the assumption of asymmetrical dyads theorists, economic strength 
has a positive effect on foreign policy behavior. By the same token, trade concentration 
is a signifi cant factor in Korea’s dyadic set, but the negative coeffi cient confi rms the 
prediction of asymmetrical dyads, while it negates the expectation of the current research. 
Interestingly, when trade concentration was disaggregated to separate variables (import 
concentration and export concentration), each of the variables was found to be a signifi cant 
determinant of foreign policy behavior in Korea’s set. The positive coeffi cients suggest 
a direct relationship with the dependent variable, and support the primary assumption of 
the current research.
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